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Physical world events have a strong and direct impact on the 
communication activity seen in the cyber world. In this paper, we 
present three physical world events where we conducted passive 
network traffic measurements to study the interaction between 
physical and cyber worlds. We consider the following types of 
events: an active shooter drill, a science festival scenario, and an 
emergency response drill involving a simulated dirty bomb attack. 
The network behavior during these events is contrasted with the 
regular network behavior. In some events, we observed substantial 
drop in network traffic whereas in some others, we noticed high 
traffic surge. Therefore, the deviation observed in the cyber world 
activity may be exploited to automate the detection of physical 
world events. The drills also involved setting up of wireless mesh 
network infrastructure to assist first responders in their rescue 
operations and provide Internet connectivity to attendees of 
science festival. Our passive network measurements provided 
valuable insights which would help us in configuring wireless 
mesh network testbeds more efficiently and thereby providing 
efficient coordination of the response activity and saving human 
lives and properties.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C. 2. 0 [Computer Communication Networks]: C.2.3 Network 
Monitoring  
General Terms 
Measurement, Documentation, Performance, Human Factors.  
Keywords 
Unexpected events, cyber world behavior, emergency 
response, cyber-physical world interactions, wireless mesh 
networks, non-invasive network measurement, high network 
traffic deviation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The growth of modern computer communications systems has 
resulted in near ubiquitous cyber systems. However, as in most 
physical infrastructure such as roads, highways, and railways, the 
computer networks are also designed in an under-provisioned 
manner where the peak usage typically results in a state where the 
demand goes beyond the designed capacity. Most cyber systems 
are underutilized during regular usage cycles except some busy 
hour periods. The pattern of the usage of a computer network 
often helps in optimizing resource allocation in bandwidth 
constrained networks such as cellular wireless networks. Only 
very limited, mostly non-civilian, systems such as military cyber 
systems contain over-provisioned communication resources. As a 
result, during some unexpected physical world events, most cyber 
communication systems see load surges to the extent of even 
incapacitating the network.  
 
Unlike in the past, the near ubiquitous cyber systems can capture 
important characteristics of the society. That is, the typical 
behavior of a network or the usage pattern of a cyber system can 
reveal the collective social characteristics of the user population. 
Therefore, through the observation of multiple facets of cyber 
systems, interesting social characteristics may be revealed. 
We conducted multiple network data collection exercises during 
real or simulated physical world events and observed the behavior 
of network traffic. Our observations reveal that the physical world 
events cause substantial impact on the behavior of cyber systems. 
However, most importantly, the behavior of the cyber systems 
differs for different physical world events. There exists very 
limited literature that reports network traffic measurements or 
network behavior observations carried out during simulated or 
real world unexpected events. We report our observations because 
it provides interesting inputs for a variety of future works. 
We present observations from three scenarios. First is an 
emergency response scenario where a simulated emergency 
response drill is conducted in a university campus building. The 
drill scenario was conducted to train the university police, the city 
police, and the city fire department to improve their preparedness 
to handle humanitarian crises such as the situation where an active 
shooter barges into a university research building and mindlessly 
killing the occupants. Such drill events are very useful in 
identifying (i) the possible delays encountered by the response 
agencies, (ii) bottlenecks during the evacuation process, and (iii) 
pitfalls associated with quick and collective decision making, and, 
thereby, improve the entire process of emergency response.  
The second scenario we considered is an entirely different 
physical world event, a science festival, where large number of 
high school students, their parents, and scientists assemble in a 
large city park where moderate number of citizens usually visits. 
The science festival, attended by more than 50,000 people, 
resulted in unexpectedly high network traffic. The observations, 
such as this from the science festival, can help the civil 
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administration to redesign the network, provision additional 
resources, and change the architectures for communication in 
order to handle such large demands in certain areas of the city 
where the demand for cyber communication resources can 
fluctuate widely.  
Finally, we present the network environmental changes resulting 
from another emergency response drill where simulated dirty 
bomb attack was enacted to the study the full scale emergency 
response plan prepared of the San Diego County.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents 
our work. In Section 2.1, we present the active shooter drill 
scenario and the network observations during the drill. Section 
2.2 discusses the San Diego Science Festival and the network 
traffic behavior observed during the event. The detailed 
description of the third scenario of a full scale emergency 
response drill and associated network observations is described in 
Section 2.3. Finally, Section 3 concludes the paper.  
2. IMPACT OF PHYSICAL WORLD 
EVENTS ON CYBER WORLD SYSTEMS  
We studied three distinct scenarios where certain non-routine 
events took place. First is an emergency response drill conducted 
at University of California San Diego (UCSD) for studying the 
humanitarian response-related issues in the event of an Active 
shooter attack on a university research facility. Second, we present 
our observation from a large scale science festival, conducted at 
the San Diego Balboa Park, where more than 50,000 people 
assembled during a daylong event. Finally, we present our 
observations from the environment of an emergency response drill 
associated with a dirty bomb attack on a soccer field gallery. 
2.1 Scenario I: UCSD Active Shooter Drill  
An active shooter is defined as either a single individual or a 
small group of disgruntled men or women who collude to destroy 
human life in a single or sequence of gun abuses spanning short or 
medium time duration. There exist many recent disasters in the 
US and elsewhere of such active shooter incidents. The most 
recent incident in GeorgiaTech, GA, USA, a psychologically 
disturbed student took lives of dozens of students and several 
faculty before taking his own. In another incident, a tenure-denied 
faculty at University of Alabama, Huntsville, USA, took out a gun 
and shot multiple people attending a faculty meeting. Such 
incidents may result in a chaotic situation in universities where 
the response is typically difficult unless the response agencies 
coordinate very well. Even evacuation of certain academic 
laboratories requires complex procedures to be followed thus 
making response in sophisticated research facilities a complex 
activity. At other times, the active shooter may cover multiple 
buildings giving rise to confusion and chaos to responders even in 
locating the attacker or the possible trajectory of the attacker. 
Even in developing countries such as India school or university 
shooting incidents are reported occasionally. Our work reveals 
that monitoring cyber infrastructure may help authorities to get 
another dimension for detecting the occurrence of a physical 
world disaster or its spatio-temporal progression.  
In this drill, referred to as University of California San Diego 
(UCSD) Active shooter drill, we study the impact of a simulated 
active shooting incident on the wired and wireless network 
serving the UCSD Leichtag building that occupied the research 
facilities in the Bio-medical research area. This drill was 
conducted jointly by UCSD police, San Diego City Police, and 
San Diego Fire Department, on October 16, 2007 in UCSD 
campus.  The main part of the drill took place at the Leichtag 
building, located on south campus (School of Medicine) of 
UCSD. Figure 1 shows the map of the area where the drill was 
conducted. 
 
Figure 1. A map of the UCSD site where the Active Shooter 
Drill was conducted on 16th October, 2007. 
 
We conducted four passive network traffic measurement 
campaigns during this drill. These are (i) wired network 
measurement on the traffic to-and-from the Leichtag building, (ii) 
Wireless LAN traffic measurement for inside and outside of the 
Leichtag building, (iii) wireless mesh network traffic monitoring 
for the CalMesh network deployed for supporting the simulated 
response activity, and (iv) CDMA cellular network measurement. 
This paper mainly presents the results from the first three 
measurement campaigns.  In addition, our team deployed a 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) testbed based on the CalMesh 
platform [1]. The CalMesh network was deployed in the courtyard 
outside the building and surrounding grassy area, covering an 
approximate 100X200 yard area with the help of four CalMesh 
boxes. The main purpose of the WMN was to help the first 
responders to communicate among themselves as well as to 
provide backbone connectivity for the health sensors the first 
responders use. However, the presence of the WMN outside the 
courtyard did not impact our measurements. 
2.1.1 Wireless Network Observations from UCSD 
Active Shooter Drill 
 
The first set of studies that we conducted on the wireless channel 
is to measure the in-building traffic observed during the drill. We, 
therefore, measured the traffic on all channels at both the 4th floor 
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and the 2nd floor of the Leichtag building. To capture the traffic 
across all channels in an efficient manner, we employed CalNode 
devices [2] developed at UCSD-CalIT2. CalNode devices are 
capable of observing traffic on all channels by using an efficient 
time-based time-driven multi-channel traffic sampling mechanism 
[3]. Using CalNodes, we sampled all IEEE 802.11 channels in 
passive manner in both 2.4 GHz (11 channels) and 5.2 GHz (13 
channels) ISM bands.  
Figure 2 shows the traffic variation on the 4th floor of the building 
which showed a low traffic on most channels and the 802.11b 
Channels 1, 6, and 11 showed moderate 600 Kbps traffic during 
the drill. The 802.11a channels (marked 12-24 in the figure) are 
found to be completely unused in the building. However, the 2nd 
floor wireless traffic seemed to be even lower than the 4th floor 
traffic. As shown in Figure 3, the 2nd floor wireless traffic on 
Leichtag building is present only on two 802.11b channels, 6 and 
11, with an average traffic of 275 kbps and 75 kbps traffic, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Wireless traffic on the 4th floor of Leichtag building 
during the UCSD Active shooter drill. 
UCSD campus was completely covered by the campus Wi-Fi 
networks since more than nine years and, therefore, penetration of 
laptops was high among the students and faculty. Wireless was 
one of the predominant methods in most parts of the engineering 
departments. Therefore, we expected the drill to show its signs on 
the wireless traffic. In order to study the traffic deviation as a 
result of the drill, we followed our measurements on wireless 
traffic on the subsequent days of the drill as well as the 
subsequent Tuesdays (since October 16, 2007 falls on a Tuesday). 
However, contrary to our expectations, we noticed no significant 
difference on the wireless traffic in the building. Subsequently our 
interactions with the researchers in the building proved that the 
wireless channel usage in that building is minimal and many 
researchers depended on the wired network for their 
communications needs. This fact was underscored by our 
observations on the wired network traffic.  
2.1.2 Wired Network Observations from UCSD 
Active Shooter Drill 
To further study the impact of the UCSD Active shooter drill on 
the communications in the Leichtab building, we obtained the 
traffic measurement on the wired network. The UCSD edge router 
and the Leichtag building core IP router were the two 
measurement points used for wired traffic measurement. We 
mainly depended on the historical traffic between IP routers in 
Leichtag Building and any host in that building for the former 
measurement. Table 1 shows the wired network measurement 
statistics. To compare the impact, we also collected the 
measurements for multiple Tuesdays in October 2007. 
 
 
Figure 3. Wireless traffic from Leichtag building 2nd floor 
during UCSD Active shooter drill. 
 
Table 1. Wired Network Measurement Statistics during 
(9AM-12PM) the UCSD Active shooter drill. 







6.1 GB 848 Pkts/sec 9.15 Mi Pkts 
Tuesday, Oct 
2, 2007  
4.9 GB  618 Pkts/sec  6.3 Mi Pkts  
Tuesday, Oct 
9, 2007  




2.3 GB  352 Pkts/sec  3.7 Mi Pkts  
 
 
We conducted two comparison studies with wired network 
measurements. First is the comparison of Tuesday's traffic. The 
campus drill was held on October 16th, 2007, a Tuesday, and, 
therefore, we compared the traffic on that day with the traffic 
during several Tuesdays prior to the drill. Some of the 
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observations made from the wired network experiments are 
briefed here.   
Figure 4 shows the average wired network traffic in bytes/seconds 
observed in Leichtag building. Due to the impact of the simulated 
active shooter incident on 10/16/2007, the traffic observed a 61% 
decrease compared to the three prior Tuesdays (see Figure 4). 
Similar difference is observed for the total traffic in terms of bytes 
observed on Tuesdays as can be found in Figure 5. Though the 
number of bytes, in MB, differs on each Tuesday, the average 
traffic reduction due to the simulated incident on 10/16/2007 
remained approximately at 61%. 
 
Figure 4. Average Bytes/s traffic observed on Tuesdays.  
 
Figure 5. Total Bytes observed on Tuesdays. 
Figure 6 shows the average traffic in terms of packets/sec 
observed. The difference in the average packets/sec that we 
observed for several Tuesdays prior to 10/16/2007 and during the 
drill day remained lower than the traffic in terms of bytes/sec. 
Even then, the decrease in the traffic on 10/16/2007 due to the 
simulated drill is significant with an average reduction of 53%. 
Similar difference is noticed for the total packets that we observed 
during the 9am-12noon time slot on Tuesdays as observed from 
Figure 7. The traffic reduction on the day of simulated incident 
remains approximately at 53% compared to the rest of the prior 
Tuesdays.   
In addition to the comparison of traffic on Tuesdays with that of 
the drill day, we also collected wired network traffic for the rest of 
the weekdays on the third week of October 2007. The 
measurements made on the rest of the week days are compared 
with the measured traffic on 10/16/2007. The observed traffic on 
10/16/2007 remained at 211K Bytes/sec whereas the rest of the 
week averaged traffic of approximately about 413Kbytes/sec as 
can be found from Figure 8. This amounted to a difference of 
48.93% decrease in traffic, which is mainly due to the simulated 
active shooter drill incident.  
Figure 9 shows the total bytes transferred over the wired network 
during the week of the UCSD Active shooter drill. According to 
the result in Figure 9, the total traffic showed a decrease of 
approximately 48% on 10/16/2007 compared to the rest of the 
days of the week. We also noticed high variation on the total 
traffic during the rest of the week's measurements. Even with high 
variance, all subsequent days had higher traffic in comparison to 




Figure 6. Average Packets/s traffic observed on Tuesdays. 
 
 
Figure 7. Total Packets observed on Tuesdays. 
Similar to the traffic in terms of bytes/sec and total bytes during 
the week of drill, we also noticed significant decrease in traffic in 
terms of average packets/sec as well as total packets. The rest of 
the week averaged a traffic approximately 629 packets/sec in 
comparison to 351 packets/sec on 10/16/2007, leading to a 
decrease of 44.16%. This can be observed in Figure 10.  
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Figure 8. Wired traffic (Bytes/sec) measurements.  
 
Figure 9. Total bytes transferred in Leichtag building during 
the week of the drill.  
Similarly, Figure 11 shows that the total number of packets 
transferred in Leichtag building also showed a decrease at 44.1% 
during the 9AM-12noon time window during which the drill was 
conducted. The total number of packets that we observed during 
the above mentioned time window was averaged to 6.78million 
packets whereas due to the drill, only 3.78 million packets were 
transferred. 
 
Figure 10. Average packets/s observed on wired network 
during the week of the drill.  
The wired network measurements from Leichtag building, the site 
of the UCSD active shooter drill, revealed one example of the 
impact of the physical world events on the cyber-world activity. In 
this case, even when the event is a simulated incident, the impact 
on the cyber world was substantial. In conclusion, the impact that 
we observed on the network traffic can potentially be used for 
remotely detecting physical world troubles or unexpected events 
using cyber-world measurements.  
2.2 Scenario II: San Diego Science Festival 
2009 
 
The second scenario where we conducted data collection 
experiments is during the Balboa Science Festival 2009 conducted 
at the San Diego Balboa Park on April 4th, 2009. Balboa park is 
San Diego city’s biggest and most attractive park and it is home to 
many museums, joy ride parks, art galleries, play houses, 
zoological park, and the world famous San Diego Zoo. During 
both working days and holidays, Balboa park attracts a 
 
Figure 11. Total packets/s observed on wired network during 
the week of the drill.  
 
large number of visitors from the city as well as outside. The San 
Diego Science Festival was conducted during the hours 8:30 AM 
to 6:00 PM on April 4th, 2009. The festival attracted more than 
50,000 additional visitors to the park that includes students from 
5th grade through high school and their parents, teachers, 
scientists, hobbyists, and general public. The purpose of the 
science festival was to encourage a larger fraction of students 
from California to take scientific careers. To achieve the aim of 
the festival, there were several stalls that set up attractive 
scientific demonstrations and experiments. Balboa park provided 
Internet connectivity to the visitors using a free public Wi-Fi 
network. The park’s public Wi-Fi network used only channels in 
the 2.4GHz spectrum. In addition to the public Wi-Fi network, an 
additional production WMN was deployed to provide higher 
bandwidth to the stalls. This production network used a fixed 
channel 10 (in the 2.4GHz Wi-Fi spectrum) for providing the 
bandwidth services to the stalls. In both the cases, the physical 
world event seemed to drastically alter the cyber environment. In 
order to compare the impact of the festival on the cyber 
environment, we additionally conducted measurements on three 
subsequent Saturdays including 14th  and 21st, March 2009 and 
12th April 2009. These dates are chosen to compare the network 
behavior observed on 4/4/2009, a Saturday.  
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2.2.1 Observations from San Diego Science Festival 
2009 
 
Figure 12 shows the total packets we observed across all channels 
in the 2.4 GHz spectrum. Compared to the three Saturdays’ 
traffic, on the day of Science Festival the traffic was on average 
0.9 million packets over a sample period of 75 minutes spanning 
12noon through 1.15pm. This traffic is about 20 times more than 
the average Saturdays’ traffic we observed. Note that our 
sampling method captures only about 10% of the traffic seen on 
the 11 channels in the 2.4GHz spectrum. Therefore, in order to 
obtain the absolute total number of packets, we need to 
extrapolate the sampled total packets shown in Figure 12. 
Similarly, in Figure 13, we observed the traffic in bits/sec that 
showed approximately more than 30 times the average typical 
Saturdays’ traffic on the science festival day.  
 
 
Figure 12. Total packets across all 2.4GHz channels on science 
festival day and subsequent Saturdays. 
 
Figure 14 shows the number of active clients during the short time 
intervals that we observed on the day of festival compared to three 
other Saturdays. It can be noticed that more than five times the 
usual number of clients were visible during the festival day in our 
measurements. Note that only a fraction of the science festival 
participants may have used the network resources. From the above 
results, it can be noticed that a physical world event such as a 
large scale festival that causes large gathering of people can create 
substantially higher network traffic load.  
Clearly, the Science Festival created a huge increase in the cyber 
world activity than the UCSD Active shooter drill which caused 
substantial decrease in the traffic.  That is, the deviation in the 
cyber network behavior from the typical can be different in 
different scenarios. 
 
Figure 13. Traffic load (Mbps) during Science Festival.  
 
Figure 14. Active clients in the wireless environment.  
 
 
2.3 Scenario III: Full Scale Emergency 
Response Drill (Operation Golden Eagle) at 
San Marcos State University  
 
The third scenario that we studied is a full scale emergency 
response drill, pseudo-named as Operation Golden Eagle, 
conducted on May 10, 2010 at San Marcos State University where 
a simulated dirty bomb blast was conducted at a soccer field. 
Figure 15 shows a view of the San Marcos state University’s 
soccer field in the immediate aftermath of the emergency response 
drill when the bomb blast was triggered. From the figure, the 
smoke from the blast may be observed and the simulated victims, 
including players and spectators, can be seen. The bomb was 
assumed to be located on the gallery and was supposed to contain 
dirty nuclear material.  
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 Figure 15. A view of the ground-zero during San Marcos full 
scale drill (smoke rising above the ground-zero and victims are 
seen).  
As a response activity, UCSD WIISARD-SAGE project deployed 
an advanced emergency response platform that included a large 
collection of medical sensors and a central resource management 
system. In order to transport the medical sensor data to the 
resource management center, we deployed a WMN that consists 
of a dozen CalMesh nodes.  Since we do not have the historical 
traffic in that location, we present the temporal progression of the 
wireless environmental characteristics here. We present the 
received signal strength observed in each channel of the spectrum.  
In Figure 16, we observed the average and peak channel RSSI 
amplitude (bottom-most plot), and topographic heat graph (middle 
graph) and traffic Vs time (top plot) obtained by using the 
wireless monitoring tool WiSpy [5]. In this figure, it can be 
noticed that the average of RSSI peaked about -68dBm to -60dBm 
with peak RSSI spanned in the range -40dBm to -30dBm. 
However, in comparison to this, Figure 17 shows the 
corresponding results during 11am-11.30am during the five hour 
long drill. It can be seen that the environment has changed quite a 
lot during the half an hour progression of the drill. First, the peak 
and average RSSI (bottom graph in Figure 17) are closer to -
60dBm than -70dBm in the Figure 16.  Besides, the channel 10 
seems to be clearly facing higher traffic as a result of the response 
activities used the CalMesh network that operated on channel 10. 
Similar changes in the cyber environment, as a result of the 
physical world activities, were noticed during the entire drill. 
Another example is the traffic progression of the channels as a 
function of time that depicts the impact on cyber world due to 
physical world events. Figure 18 shows the temporal and spectral 
variation of traffic (in bits per second) during Operation Golden 
Eagle. Compared to other channels, notice that Channel 10 is the 
heaviest loaded and the load varies as the drill proceeded to the 
conclusion. The peak traffic, at the end of the drill, is a result of a 
throughput capacity test by flooding the network by the 
researchers who deployed the network testbed.  
 
Figure 16. Wireless environmental characteristics at 10.30-
11am during Operation Golden Eagle drill at San Marcos, CA 
on May 10, 2010.  
 
 
Figure 17. Wireless environment changes during 11am-
11.30am during Operation Golden Eagle.  
 
Finally, in Figure 19, we present another dimension of the 
relationship between the physical world events and the 
corresponding cyber world impact. In this figure, the number of 
active clients observed during the Operation Golden Eagle has 
clearly followed the drill duration as marked in the figure. 
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 Figure 18. Temporal variation of channel traffic during 
Operation Golden Eagle.  
The active users in the wireless network grew as the drill is in full 
swing at 10.15am and remained high till near the completion of 
the drill 12.45pm. After about 12.45pm, there was a drill 
conclusion exercise during which network performance 
measurements were conducted. Therefore, the active clients 
behavior reflected that fact as well. The observation tells us that 
the physical world events can result in clear and substantial 
changes in the cyber world events.  
 
Figure 19. Relationship between the physical world drill and 
the number of active clients (cyber network users):  the active 




The effect of events in the physical world is increasingly visible in 
the cyber world. We conducted several medium and large scale 
real world experiments to quantify the impact of physical world 
events on the cyber world. We presented our experiments from 
three scenarios: (i) UCSD Active Shooter drill, (ii) San Diego 
Science Festival 2009, and (iii) Operation Golden Eagle Drill at 
San Marcos State University. We noticed substantial impact on 
cyber world activity due to unexpected events as deviation can 
range from 40% reduction to about 30 times increase of the 
average network traffic during regular times.  
In UCSD Active shooter drill, we observed wired network traffic 
drop from 44% to 61% whereas during the San Diego Science 
Festival 2009, we observed a traffic load increase of 20-30 times 
the regular traffic.  
Since the relationship between physical world events and cyber 
world behavior is so strong, detecting cyber world changes may 
help quickly detect many characteristics of the physical world 
such as the occurrence and progress of the unexpected events in 
the world. Some early examples for such applications can be 
found in [7][8].  
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